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Abstract
We provide a new approach to training neural
models to exhibit transparency in a well-defined,
functional manner. Our approach naturally oper-
ates over structured data and tailors the predictor,
functionally, towards a chosen family of (local)
witnesses. The estimation problem is setup as a
co-operative game between an unrestricted predic-
tor such as a neural network, and a set of witnesses
chosen from the desired transparent family. The
goal of the witnesses is to highlight, locally, how
well the predictor conforms to the chosen fam-
ily of functions, while the predictor is trained to
minimize the highlighted discrepancy. We empha-
size that the predictor remains globally powerful
as it is only encouraged to agree locally with lo-
cally adapted witnesses. We analyze the effect
of the proposed approach, provide example for-
mulations in the context of deep graph and se-
quence models, and empirically illustrate the idea
in chemical property prediction, temporal model-
ing, and molecule representation learning.
1. Introduction
Modern machine learning tasks are increasingly complex,
requiring flexible models with large numbers of parame-
ters such as deep networks (Silver et al., 2016; Vaswani
et al., 2017; Huang et al., 2017). Such modeling gains often
come at the cost of transparency or interpretability. This
is particularly problematic when predictions are fed into
decision-critical applications such as medicine where the
ability to verify predictions may be just as important as the
raw predictive power.
It seems plausible to guide a flexible neural network towards
a complex yet well-understood (i.e., transparent) functional
class. For example, in realizing Wasserstein-1 distance (Ar-
jovsky et al., 2017), the discriminator should be limited
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to 1-Lipschitz functions. A strict adherence to a complex,
global functional class is not the only way to achieve trans-
parency. For example, linearity is a desirable characteristic
for transparency but is sensible to enforce only locally. We
offer therefore a new notion of transparency – functional
transparency – where the goal is to guide models to adopt
a desirable local behavior yet allowing them to be more
flexible globally. Note that functional transparency should
be established only approximately in many cases since, e.g.,
strict local linearity implies global linearity.
Previous approaches to interpretability have mainly focused
on models that operate on fixed-size data, such as scalar-
features (Lakkaraju et al., 2016) or image prediction (Sel-
varaju et al., 2016; Mahendran & Vedaldi, 2015). The em-
phasis has been on feature relevance or selection (Ribeiro
et al., 2016). Recent methods do address some of the chal-
lenges in sequential data (Lei et al., 2016; Arras et al., 2017),
primarily in NLP tasks where the input sequence is discrete.
Interpretability for continuous temporal data (Al-Shedivat
et al., 2017; Wu et al., 2018a) or graph structures remains
largely unexplored.
We develop a novel approach to transparency that is natu-
rally suited for structured data. At the core of our approach
is a game-theoretic definition of transparency. This is set
up as a two-player co-operative game between a predictor
and a witness. The predictor remains a complex model
whereas the witness is chosen from a simple transparent
family. Transparency arises from the fact that the predictor
is encouraged to exemplify simple behavior as captured by
the witness in each local region while remaining globally
powerful. The approach differs from global regularization
of models towards interpretability (Wu et al., 2018a), mod-
els that are constructed a priori to be interpretable, either
architecturally or in terms of the function class (Al-Shedivat
et al., 2017; Lei et al., 2016), or from post-hoc explanations
of black-box methods via local perturbations (Ribeiro et al.,
2016; Alvarez-Melis & Jaakkola, 2017). Our models are
guided towards functional transparency during learning.
As an illustration, we contrast our approach with methods
that seek to obtain interpretable explanations after the fact
(e.g., (Ribeiro et al., 2016)). Derived explanation after train-
ing can be misleading in some cases if the explanation does
not match the functional behavior of the model. For exam-
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(b) The explanation from a normally trained model.
Figure 1. During testing, we fit decision trees to our model and an unregularized model on molecule property prediction at the same local
neighborhood such that the functional approximations are comparable in AUC (because the scale is not crucial). The split criterion on
each node is based on the existence of a complete chemical substructure in Morgan fingerprints (Rogers & Hahn, 2010). The color of each
Morgan fingerprint simply reflects the radius of the fingerprint.
ple, Figure 1 shows local decision tree approximations for
two models: our model trained with such local witnesses
(a, left), and an unregularized model (b, right). The trees
are constructed to achieve the same level of approximation.
The tree for the unregularized model only filters one sample
in each split, lacking generality to explain the (local) behav-
ior. This phenomenon is related to unstable explanations
that arise with already trained models (Alvarez-Melis &
Jaakkola, 2018b; Ghorbani et al., 2019).
The game theoretic approach is very flexible in terms of
models and scenarios. We therefore illustrate the approach
across a few novel scenarios: explaining graph convolu-
tional models using decision trees, revealing local func-
tional variation of a deep sequence model, and exemplifying
decision rules for the encoder in unsupervised graph repre-
sentation learning. Our main contributions are:
• A novel game-theoretic approach to transparency, ap-
plicable to a wide range of prediction models, architec-
tures, and local transparency classes, without requiring
differentiability.
• Analysis on the effective size of the local regions and
establishing equilibria pertaining to different game for-
mulations.
• Illustration of deep models across several tasks, from
chemical property prediction, physical component
modeling, to molecule representation learning.
2. Related Work
The role of transparency is to expose the inner-workings
of an algorithm (Citron & Pasquale, 2014; Pasquale, 2015),
such as decision making systems. This is timely for state-
of-the-art machine learning models that are typically over-
parameterized (Silver et al., 2016; He et al., 2016) and there-
fore effectively black-box models. An uncontrolled model
is also liable to various attacks (Goodfellow et al., 2014).
Our goal is to regularize a complex deep model so that it
exhibits a desired local behavior. The approach confers an
approximate operational guarantee rather than directly inter-
pretability. In contrast, examples of archetypal interpretable
models include linear classifiers, decision trees (Quinlan,
2014), and decision sets (Lakkaraju et al., 2016); recent
approaches also guide complex models towards highlight-
ing pieces of input used for prediction (Lei et al., 2016),
grounding explanations via graphical models (Al-Shedivat
et al., 2017), or generalizing linear models while maintain-
ing interpretability (Alvarez-Melis & Jaakkola, 2018a). A
model conforming to a known functional behavior, at least
locally, as in our approach, is not necessarily itself human-
interpretable. The approximate guarantee we offer is that
the complex model indeed follows such a behavior and we
also quantify to what extent this guarantee is achieved.
Previous work on approximating a functional class via
neural networks can be roughly divided into two types:
parametrization-based and regularization-based methods.
Works in the first category seek self-evident adherence to a
functional class, which include maintaining Lipschitz con-
tinuity via weight clipping (Arjovsky et al., 2017), orthog-
onal transformation via scaled Cayley transform of skew-
symmetric matrices (Helfrich et al., 2017), and “stable” re-
current networks via spectral norm projection on the transi-
tion matrix (Miller & Hardt, 2018).
A softer approach is to introduce a regularization problem
that encourages neural networks to match properties of the
functional class. Such regularization problem might come in
the form of a gradient penalty as used in several variants of
GAN (Gulrajani et al., 2017; Bellemare et al., 2017; Mroueh
et al., 2018) under the framework of integral probability
metrics (IPM) (Mu¨ller, 1997), layer-wise regularization of
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transformation matrices (Cisse et al., 2017) towards parse-
val tightness (Kovacˇevic´ et al., 2008) for robustness, and
recent adversarial approaches to learn representations for
certain independence statements (Ganin et al., 2016; Zhao
et al., 2017). Typically, a tailored regularization problem is
introduced for each functional class. Our work follows this
general theme in the sense of casting the overall problem
as a regularization problem. However, we focus on trans-
parency and our approach – a general co-operative game
– is quite different. Our methodology is applicable to any
choice of (local) functional class without any architectural
restrictions on the deep model whose behavior is sculpted.
The optimization of functional deviation in the game must
remain tractable, of course.
3. Methodology
In this work, given a dataset D = {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 ⊂ X ×
Y , we learn an (unrestricted) predictive function f ∈ F :
X → Y together with a transparent – and usually simpler
– function g ∈ G : X → Y defined over a functional class
G. We refer to functions f and g as the predictor and the
witness, respectively, throughout the paper. Note that we
need not make any assumptions on the functional class F ,
instead allowing a flexible class of predictors. In contrast,
the family of witnesses G is strictly constrained to be a
transparent functional set, such as the set of linear functions
or decision trees. We assume to have a deviation function
d : Y × Y → R≥0 such that d(y, y′) = 0 ⇐⇒ y = y′,
which measures discrepancy between two elements in Y and
can be used to optimize f and g. To simplify the notation,
we define Dx := {xi : (xi, yi) ∈ D}. We introduce our
game-theoretic framework in §3.1, analyze it in §3.2, and
instantiate the framework with concrete models in §4.
3.1. Game-Theoretic Transparency
There are many ways to use a witness function g ∈ G to
guide the predictor f by means of discrepancy measures.
However, since the witness functions can be weak such as
linear functions, we cannot expect that a reasonable predic-
tor would agree to it globally. Instead, we make a slight
generalization to enforce this criterion only locally, over
different sets of neighborhoods. To this end, we define local
transparency by measuring how close f is to the family G
over a local neighborhood B(xi) ⊂ X around an observed
point xi. One straightforward instantiation of such a neigh-
borhood B(xi) in temporal domain will be simply a local
window of points {xi−, . . . , xi+}. Our resulting local
discrepancy measure is
min
g∈G
1
|B(xi)|
∑
xj∈B(xi)
d(f(xj), g(xj)). (1)
The summation can be replaced by an integral when a con-
tinuous neighborhood is used. The minimizing witness
function, gˆxi , is indexed by the point xi around which it
is estimated; depending on the function f , the minimizing
witness can change from one neighborhood to another. If
we view the minimization problem game-theoretically, gˆxi
is the best response strategy of the local witness around xi.
The local discrepancy measure can be incorporated into an
overall estimation criterion in many ways so as to guide the
predictor towards the desired functional form. This guidance
can be offered as a uniform constraint with a permissible
δ-margin, as an additive symmetric penalty, or defined asym-
metrically as a game theoretic penalty where the information
sets for the predictor and the witness are no longer identical.
We consider each of these in turn.
Uniform criterion. A straightforward formulation is to
confine f to remain within a margin δ of the best fitting
witness for every local neighborhood. Assume that a primal
lossL(·, ·) is given for a learning task. The criterion imposes
the δ-margin constraint uniformly as∑
(xi,yi)∈D
L(f(xi), yi) (2)
s.t.min
g∈G
1
|B(xi)|
∑
xj∈B(xi)
d(f(xj), g(xj)) ≤ δ, ∀xi ∈ Dx.
We assume that the optimal g with respect to each constraint
may be efficiently found due to the simplicity of G and
the regularity of d(·, ·). We also assume that the partial
derivatives with respect to f , for fixed witnesses, can be
computed straightforwardly under sufficiently regular L(·, ·)
in a Lagrangian form. In this case, we can solve for f , local
witnesses, and the Lagrange multipliers using the mirror-
prox algorithm (Nemirovski, 2004).
The hard constraints in the uniform criterion will lead to
strict transparency guarantees. However, the effect may be
undesirable in some cases where the observed data (hence
the predictor) do not agree with the witness in all places.
The resulting loss of performance may be too severe. As
an alternative, we can enforce the agreement with local
witnesses to be small in aggregate across neighborhoods.
Symmetric game. We define an additive, unconstrained,
symmetric criterion to smoothly trade off between perfor-
mance and transparency. The resulting objective is∑
(xi,yi)∈D
[
L(f(xi), yi) +
min
g∈G
λ
|B(xi)|
∑
xj∈B(xi)
d(f(xj), g(xj))
]
(3)
To illustrate the above idea, we generate a synthetic dataset
to show a neighborhood in Figure 2a with an unconstrained
piecewise linear predictor f ∈ Fpiecewise linear in Figure 2b.
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(a) Neighborhood B(x20) (b) f ∈ Fpiecewise linear
(c) gxi=1 ∈ Glinear (d) gxi=1 ∈ Gdecision stump
Figure 2. Examples of fitting a neighborhood B(x20) (2a) with a
piecewise linear predictor (2b). Using different witness families
(Figs. 2c&2d, dashed lines) leads to predictors (solid green) with
different behaviors, despite yielding the same error (MSE=1.026).
Clearly, f does not agree with a linear witness within this
neighborhood. However, when we solve for f together with
a linear witness gxi ∈ Glinear as in Figure 2c, the resulting
function has a small residual deviation from Glinear, more
strongly adhering to the linear functional class while still
closely tracking the observed data. Figure 2d shows the flex-
ibility of our framework where a very different functional
behavior can be induced by changing the functional class
for the witness.
Asymmetric game. Solving the symmetric criterion can be
computationally inefficient since the predictor is guided by
its deviation from each of the local witness on all points
within each of the local neighborhoods. Moreover, the pre-
dictor value at any point xi is subject to potentially conflict-
ing regularization terms across the neighborhoods, which
is undesirable. The inner summation in Eq. (3) may in-
volve different sizes of neighborhoods B(xi) (e.g., end-
point boundary cases) and this makes it more challenging to
parallelize the computation.
We would like to impose even functional regularization at
every f(xi) based on how much the value deviates from
the witness associated with the local region B(xi). This
approach leads to an asymmetric co-operative formulation,
where the information sets for the predictor f and local
witnesses gxi differ. Specifically, the local best-response
witness gˆxi is chosen to minimize the local discrepancy as
in Eq. (1), and thus depends on f values within the whole
region; in contrast, the predictor f only receives feedback
in terms of the resulting deviation at xi, only seeing gˆxi(xi).
From the point of view of the predictor f , the best response
strategy is obtained by minimizing∑
(xi,yi)∈D
[
L(f(xi), yi) + λ d(f(xi), gˆxi(xi))
]
(4)
To train the proposed method, we perform alternating up-
dates for f(·) and gˆxi(·) on their respective criteria.
3.2. Analysis
We consider here the effectiveness of regularization in re-
lation to the neighborhood size and establish fixed point
equations for the predictor under the three estimation cri-
teria. For simplicity, we assume X = Rd and Y = R, but
the results are generalizable to our examples in §4. All the
proofs are in Appendix A.
Neighborhood size. The formulation involves a key trade-
off between the size of the region where the function should
be simple and the overall accuracy achieved by the predictor.
When the neighborhood is too small, local witnesses become
perfect, inducing no regularization on f . Thus the size of the
region is a key parameter. A neighborhood size is sufficient
if the witness class G cannot readily overfit f values within
the neighborhood. Formally,
Definition 1. We say that a neighborhood sizem is effective
for G if for any f 6∈ G we can find B ⊂ X : |B| = m s.t.
min
g∈G
1
m
∑
x∈B
d(f(x), g(x)) > 0. (5)
A trivial example is when G is the constant class, a neighbor-
hood size m is effective if m > 1. Note that the neighbor-
hood B in the above definition can be any finite collection
of points B(·). For example, the points in the neighborhood
induced by a temporal window {xi−, . . . , xi+} need not
remain in a small `p-norm ball.
For linear models and decision trees, we have
• d+ 1 is the tight lower bound on the effective neighbor-
hood size for the linear class.
• 2k + 1 is the tight lower bound on the effective neighbor-
hood size for the decision tree class with depth bounded
by k.
When the sample sizes within the neighborhoods fall below
such bounds, regularization can still be useful if the witness
class is not uniformly flexible or if the algorithm for finding
the witness is limited (e.g., greedy algorithm for decision
trees).
Equilibrium solutions. The symmetric game constitutes a
standard minimization problem, but the existence or unique-
ness of equilibria under the asymmetric game are not ob-
vious. Our main results in this section make the following
assumptions.
(A1) the predictor f is unconstrained.
(A2) both the loss and deviation are squared errors.
(A3) |B(xi)| = m,∀xi ∈ Dx.
(A4) xj ∈ B(xi) =⇒ xi ∈ B(xj),∀xi, xj ∈ Dx.
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(A5) ∪xi∈DxB(xi) = Dx.
We note that (A3) and (A4) are not technically necessary
but simplify the presentation. We denote the predictor in the
uniform criterion (Eq. (2)), the symmetric game (Eq. (3)),
and the asymmetric game (Eq. (4)) as fU , fS , and fA, re-
spectively. We use Xi ∈ Rm×d to denote the neighbor-
hood B(xi) = {x′1, . . . , x′m} (Xi = [x′1, . . . , x′m]>), and
f(Xi) ∈ Rm to denote the vector [f(x′1), . . . , f(x′m)]>.
X†j denotes the pseudo-inverse of Xj . Then we have
Theorem 2. If (A1-5) hold and the witness is in the linear
family, the optimal fS satisfies
f∗S(xi) =
1
1 + λ
[
yi +
λ
m
( ∑
xj∈B(xi)
X†j f
∗
S(Xj)
)>
xi
]
,
and the optimal fA, at every equilibrium, is the fixed point
f∗A(xi) =
1
1 + λ
[
yi + λ(X
†
i f
∗
A(Xi))
>xi
]
,∀xi ∈ Dx.
The equilibrium in the linear class is not unique when the
witness is not fully determined in a neighborhood due to de-
generacy. To avoid these cases, we can use Ridge regression
to obtain a stable equilibrium (proved also in Appendix).
A special case of Theorem 2 is when xi = [1],∀xi ∈ Dx,
which effectively yields the equilibrium result for the con-
stant class; we found it particularly useful to understand
the similarity between the two games in this scenario.
Concretely, each (X†j f(Xj))
>xi becomes equivalent to
1
m
∑
xk∈B(xj) f(xk). As a result, the solution for both the
symmetric and asymmetric game induce the optimal pre-
dictors as recursive convolutional averaging of neighboring
points with the same decay rate λ/(1 + λ), while the convo-
lutional kernel evolves twice as fast in the symmetric game
than in the asymmetric game.
Next, we show that the hard uniform constraint criterion
yields a very different equilibrium.
Theorem 3. If (A1-5) hold and the witness is in the linear
family, the optimal fU satisfies
f∗U (xi) =

α(xi, f
∗
U ), if α(xi, f
∗
U ) > yi,
β(xi, f
∗
U ), if β(xi, f
∗
U ) < yi,
yi, otherwise,
for xi ∈ Dx, where
α(xi, f
∗
U ) = max
xj∈B(xi)
[
(X†j f
∗
U (Xj))
>xi
−
√
δm−
∑
xk∈B(xj)\{xi}
(f∗U (xk)− (X†j f∗U (Xj))>xk)2
]
;
β(xi, f
∗
U ) = min
xj∈B(xi)
[
(X†j f
∗
U (Xj))
>xi
+
√
δm−
∑
xk∈B(xj)\{xi}
(f∗U (xk)− (X†j f∗U (Xj))>xk)2
]
.
A noticeable difference from the games is that, under uni-
form criterion, the optimal predictor f∗U (xi) may faithfully
output the actual label yi if the functional constraint is sat-
isfied, while the functional constraints are translated into a
“convolutional” operator in the games.
Efficient computation. We also analyze ways of acceler-
ating the computation required for solving the symmetric
game. An equivalent criterion is given by
Lemma 4. If d(·, ·) is squared error, L(·, ·) is differentiable,
f is sub-differentiable, and A(4-5) hold, then∑
(xi,yi)∈D
L(f(xi), yi) + λ
N¯i
[
N¯if(xi)−
∑
xt∈B(xi)
gˆxt(xi)
|B(xt)|
]2
,
where N¯i :=
∑
xt∈B(xi)
1
|B(xt)| , induces the same equilib-
rium as the symmetric game.
The result is useful when training f on GPU and gˆxi is
solved analytically on CPU. Compared to a for-loop to han-
dle different neighborhood sizes for Eq. (3) on the GPU,
computing a summarized feedback as in Lemma 4 on CPU
is more efficient (and easier to implement).
Discussion We investigated here discrete neighborhoods
and they are suitable also for structured data as in the exper-
iments. The method itself can be generalized to continuous
neighborhoods with an additional difficulty: the exact com-
putation and minimization of functional deviation between
the predictor and the witness in such neighborhood is in
general intractable. We may apply results from learning
theory (e.g., (Shamir, 2015)) to bound the (generalization)
gap between the deviation computed by finite samples from
the continuous neighborhood and the actual deviation under
a uniform probability measure.
4. Examples
4.1. Conditional Sequence Generation
The basic idea of co-operative modeling extends naturally
to conditional sequence generation over longer periods.
Broadly, the mechanism allows us to inspect the temporal
progression of sequences on a longer term basis.
Given an observation sequence x1, . . . , xt ∈ Rc, the goal
is to estimate probability p(xt+1:T |x1:t) over future events
xt+1, . . . , xT ∈ Rc, typically done via maximum likelihood.
For brevity, we use x1:i to denote x1, . . . , xi. We model the
conditional distribution of xi+1 given x1:i as a multivariate
Gaussian distribution with mean µ(x1:i) and covariance
Σ(x1:i), both parametrized as recurrent neural networks.
Each local witness model gx1:i(·) is estimated based on the
neighborhood B(x1:i) := {x1:i−, . . . , x1:i+} with respect
to the mean function µ(·). A natural choice would be a
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K-order Markov autoregressive (AR) model with an `2
deviation loss as:
min
θ
∑
x1:t∈B(x1:i)
‖
K−1∑
k=0
θk+1 · xt−k + θ0 − µ(x1:t)‖22,
where θk ∈ Rc×c,∀k > 0 and θ0 ∈ Rc. The AR model
admits an analytical solution similar to linear regression.
4.2. Chemical Property Prediction
The models discussed in §3 can be instantiated on highly-
structured data, such as molecules, too. These are usually
represented as a graphM = (V, E) whose nodes encode
the atom types and edges encode the chemical bonds. Such
representation enables the usage of recent graph convolu-
tional networks (GCNs) (Dai et al., 2016; Lei et al., 2017)
as the predictor f . As it is hard to realize a simple ex-
planation on the raw graph representation, we exploit an
alternative data representation for the witness model; we
leverage depth-bounded decision trees that take as input
Morgan fingerprints (Rogers & Hahn, 2010) x(M), which
are vector representations for the binary existence of a chem-
ical substructures in a molecule (e.g., the nodes in Fig. 1).
The neighborhood B(M) includes molecules {M′} with
Tanimoto similarity greater than 0.6, automatically con-
structed through matching molecular pair analysis (Griffen
et al., 2011). Here we use a multi-label binary classification
task as an example, and adopt a cross-entropy loss for each
label axis for simplicity. At each neighborhood B(M), we
construct a witness decision tree g that minimizes the total
variation (TV) from the predictor as
min
g∈Gtree
1
|B(M)|
∑
M′∈B(M)
dim(Y)∑
i=1
|f(M′)i − g(x(M′))i|. (6)
We note that Eq. (6) is an upper bound and efficient alterna-
tive to fitting a tree for each label axis independently.
4.3. Molecule Representation Learning
Our approach can be further applied to learn transparent
latent graph representations by variational autoencoders
(VAEs) (Kingma & Welling, 2013; Jin et al., 2018). Con-
cretely, given a molecular graph M = (V, E), the VAE
encoder q outputs the approximated posterior zM ∼
N (µM,ΣM) over the latent space, where zM is the con-
tinuous representation of moleculeM. Following common
practice, ΣM is restricted to be diagonal. The VAE decoder
then reconstructs the moleculeM from its probabilistic en-
coding zM. Our goal here is to guide the behavior of the
neural encoder q such that the derivation of (probabilistic)
zM can be locally explained by a decision tree.
We adopt the same setting for the witness function and
neighborhoods as in §4.2, except that the local decision
Table 1. Performance on the Tox-21 dataset. AUCD(gˆM, f) and
AUCB(gˆM, f) generalize the AUC score to use f values as labels,
computed on the testing data and their neighborhoods, respectively.
Aspect Measure GAMEunif GAMEsym DEEP
Performance AUC(f, y) 0.744 0.826 0.815
(the higher the better) AUC(gˆM, y) 0.742 0.824 0.818
Transparency AUCB(gˆM, f) 0.764 0.759 0.735
(the higher the better) AUCD(gˆM, f) 0.959 0.967 0.922
tree g now outputs a joint normal distribution with pa-
rameters [µ̂M, Σ̂M]. To train the encoder, we extend the
original VAE objective LVAE with a local deviation loss
LGtree defined on the KL divergence between the VAE
posterior q(M) = N (µM,ΣM) and witness posterior
g(x(M)) = N (µ̂M, Σ̂M) at each neighborhood as
LGtree := 1|D|
∑
M∈D
min
g∈Gtree
∑
M′∈B(M)
KL(g(x(M′))||q(M′))
|B(M)|
The VAE is trained to maximize LVAE + λ · LGtree . For
ease of implementation, we asymmetrically estimate each
decision tree g with mean squared error between the vectors
[µM,ΣM] and [µ̂M, Σ̂M].
5. Experiments
We conduct experiments on chemical and time-series
datasets. Due to the lack of existing works for explain-
ing structured data, we adopt an ablation setting – compar-
ing our approach (GAME) versus an unregularized model
(DEEP) – and focus on measuring the transparency. We use
subscripts to denote specific versions of the GAME models.
Note that we only fit the local witnesses to the DEEP model
during testing for evaluation. Unless otherwise noted, the
reported results are based on the testing set.
5.1. Molecule Property Prediction
We conduct experiments on molecular toxicity prediction
on the Tox21 dataset from MoleculeNet benchmark (Wu
et al., 2018b), which contains 12 binary labels and 7, 831
molecules. The labels are very unbalanced; the fraction of
the positive label is between 16.15% and 3.51% among the
12 labels. We use GCN as the predictor and decision trees
as the witnesses as in §4.2. The neighborhood sizes m of
about 60% of the molecules are larger than 2, whose median
and maximum are 59 and 300, respectively. Since each
neighborhood has a different size m, we set the maximum
tree depth as max{dlog2(m)e−1, 1} for each neighborhood,
which ensures that the corresponding size m is effective for
m > 2 (see Definition 1). More details are in Appendix B.
Evaluation Measures: For all the measures, the results are
averaged across the label axes.
(1) Performance: For the predictor, we compare its pre-
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dictions with respect to the labels in AUC, denoted as
AUC(f, y). As each local witness gˆM(x(M)) also real-
izes a function ofM, it is also evaluated against the labels
in AUC, denoted as AUC(gˆM, y).
(2) Transparency: As labels are unavailable for testing data
in practice, it is more realistic to measure the similarity
between the predictor and the local witnesses to understand
the validity of the explanations derived from the decision
trees G. To this end1, we generalize the AUC criterion for
continuous labels for N references y and predictions y′ as
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
I(yi > yj)I(y′i > y′j)/
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
I(yi > yj).
The proposed score has the same pairwise interpretation as
AUC, recovers AUC when y is binary, and is normalized
to [0, 1]. Locally, we measure the criterion for the local
witnesses with respect to the predictor in each testing neigh-
borhood as the local deviation, where the average result is
denoted as AUCB(gˆM, f). Globally, the criterion is also
validated among the testing data, denoted as AUCD(gˆM, f).
The results with the uniform and symmetric criteria are
shown in Table 1. A baseline vanilla decision tree, with
depth tuned between 2 and 30, yields 0.617 in AUC(f, y).
Compared to GAMEsym, the local deviation in GAMEunif is
marginally improved due to the strict constraint at the cost
of severe performance loss. We investigate the behaviors
in training neighborhoods and find that GAMEsym exhibits a
tiny fraction of high deviation losses, allowing the model to
behave more flexibly than the strictly constrained GAMEunif
(see Figure 5 in Appendix B). In terms of performance, our
GAMEsym model is superior to the DEEP model in both the
predictor and local witnesses. When comparing the wit-
nesses to the predictor, locally and globally, the GAME mod-
els significantly improve the transparency from the DEEP
model. The local deviation should be interpreted relatively
since the tree depth inherently prevents local overfitting.
We visualize the resulting witness trees in Figure 1 under
the same transparency constraint: for a local neighborhood,
we grow the witness tree for the DEEP model until the
local transparency in AUCB is comparable to the GAMEsym
model. For explaining the same molecule, the tree for the
DEEP model is deeper and extremely unbalanced. Since a
Morgan fingerprint encodes the existence of a substructure
of molecule graphs, an unbalanced tree focusing on the left
branch (non-existence of a substructure) does not capture
much generality. Hence, the explanation of the DEEP model
does not provide as much insight as our GAMEsym model.
Here we do an analysis on the tree depth constraint for
the witness model, as a shallower tree is easier to interpret,
1Since the predictor probability can be scaled arbitrarily to min-
imize the TV from decision trees without affecting performance,
using TV to measure transparency as used in training is not ideal.
Table 2. AUCD(gˆM, f) score on different ∆ in the Tox-21 dataset
(lower ∆ implies shallower trees).
Model ∆ = 0 ∆ = −1 ∆ = −2 ∆ = −3
GAME 0.967 0.967 0.964 0.958
DEEP 0.922 0.916 0.915 0.914
Table 3. Performance of the symmetric and asymmetric setting of
the GAME model with  = 9.
(×10−2) λ 0 0.1 1 10 100 AR
GAMEasym
Error 8.136 8.057 8.309 9.284 9.794 9.832
Dev. 4.197 4.178 3.431 1.127 0.186 0.000
TV 7.341 7.197 5.706 1.177 0.144 0.000
GAMEsym
Error 8.136 8.089 8.315 9.314 9.807 9.832
Dev. 4.197 4.169 3.426 1.116 0.182 0.000
TV 7.341 7.292 5.621 1.068 0.132 0.000
but more challenging to establish transparency due to the
restricted complexity. To this end, we revise the depth con-
straint to max{dlog2(m)e − 1 + ∆, 1} during training and
testing, and vary ∆ ∈ {−3, . . . , 0}. All the resulting GAME
models outperform the DEEP models in AUC(f, y), and
we report the transparency score in terms of AUCD(gˆM, f)
in Table 2. Even when ∆ = −3, the witness trees in our
GAME model still represent the predictor more faithfully
than those in the DEEP model with ∆ = 0.
5.2. Physical Component Modeling
We next validate our approach on a physical component
modeling task with the bearing dataset from NASA (Lee
et al., 2016), which records 4-channel acceleration data on
4 co-located bearings. We divide the sequence into disjoint
subsequences, resulting in 200, 736 subsequences. Since
the dataset exhibits high frequency periods of 5 points and
low frequency periods of 20 points, we use the first 80 points
in an sequence to forecast the next 20. We parametrize µ(·)
and Λ(·) jointly by stacking 1 layer of CNN, LSTM, and 2
fully connected layers. We set the neighborhood radius  to
9 such that the witnesses are fit with completely different
data for the beginning and the end of the sequence. The
Markov order K is set to 2 to ensure the effectiveness of the
neighborhood sizes. More details are in Appendix C.
Evaluation involves three different types of errors: 1) ‘error’
is the root mean squared error (RMSE) between greedy au-
toregressive generation and the ground truth, 2) ‘deviation’
is RMSE between the predictor µ(x1:i) and the witness
gˆx1:i(x1:i), and 3) ‘TV’ is the average total variation of wit-
ness gˆx1:i parameters [θ, θ0] between every two consecutive
time points. Since the deviation and error are both computed
on the same space in RMSE, the two measures are readily
comparable. For testing, the witnesses are estimated based
on the autoregressive generative trajectories.
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Figure 3. Visualizing the linear witnesses (middle and right plots) on the first channel (left plot) along the autoregressive generative
trajectory (x-axis) on the bearing dataset. The y-axis of the parameters from 0 to 8 denotes the bias (θ0)1 and weights (θ1)1,1:4, (θ2)1,1:4.
We present the results in Table 3 to study the impact of the
game coefficient λ and the symmetry of the games. The
trends in the measures are quite monotonic on λ: with an
increasing λ, the model gradually operates toward the AR
family with lower deviation and TV but higher error. When
λ = 0.1, the GAME models are more accurate than the
DEEP model (λ = 0) due to the regularization effect. Given
the same hyper-parameters, marginally lower deviation in
the symmetric game than in the asymmetric game confirms
our analysis about the similarity between the two. In prac-
tice, the asymmetric game is more efficient and substantially
easier to implement than the symmetric game. Indeed, the
training time is 20.6 sequences/second for the asymmetric
game, and 14.6 sequences/second for the symmetric game.
If we use the formula in Lemma 4, the symmetric game can
be accelerated to 20.4 sequences/second, but the formula
does not generalize to other deviation losses.
We visualize the witnesses with their parameters [θ0, θ]
along the autoregressive generative trajectories in Figure 3.
The stable functional patterns of the GAME model as re-
flected by θ, before and after the 9th point, highlight not
only close local alignments of the predictor and the AR fam-
ily (being constant vectors across columns) but also flexible
variation of functional properties on the predictor across
regions. In contrast, the DEEP model yields unstable lin-
ear coefficients, and relies more on offsets/biases θ0 than
the GAME model, while the linear weights are more useful
for grounding the coordinate relevance for interpretability.
Finally, we remark that despite the uninterpretable nature
of temporal signals, the functional pattern reflected by the
linear weights as shown here yields a simple medium to un-
derstand its behavior. Due to space limitation, the additional
analysis and visualization are included in Appendix C.
5.3. Molecule Representation Learning
Finally, we validate our approach on learning representa-
tions for molecules with VAEs, where we use the junction
tree VAE (Jin et al., 2018) as an example. Here the encoders
of VAEs, with and without the guidance of local decision
trees as in §4.3, are denoted as DEEP and GAME, respec-
tively. The models are trained on the ZINC dataset (Sterling
& Irwin, 2015) containing 1.5M molecules, and evaluated
on a test set with 20K molecules. We measure the perfor-
mance in terms of the evidence lower bound (ELBO) over
Figure 4. The local decision tree explains the latent representation
for a molecule (upper left) by identifying locally discriminative
chemical substructures. The leaf nodes are annotated with their
sizes (number of molecules belonging to that cluster).
Table 4. The performance in ELBO for the raw neural encoders
and locally adapted decision trees. The deviation is defined in §4.3.
Model ELBOneural encoder ELBOdecision tree deviation (LGtree )
DEEP -21.6 -25.4 4.64
GAME -21.5 -25.1 3.98
the test set. Here we consider two scenarios: the ELBO
using the raw latent representations from the original neural
encoder, and using the interpreted latent representations gen-
erated by locally fitted decision trees. The average deviation
loss in KL divergence LGtree , defined in §4.3, over the testing
neighborhoods is also evaluated.
The results are shown in Table 4. Our GAME model per-
forms consistently better under all the metrics. Figure 4
shows an example of how our decision tree explains the
local neighborhood of a molecule. We found most of the
substructures selected by the decision tree occur in the side
chains outside of Bemis-Murcko scaffold (Bemis & Murcko,
1996). This shows the variation in the latent representation
mostly reflects the local changes in the molecules, which
is expected since changes in the scaffold typically lead to
global changes such as chemical property changes.
6. Conclusion
We propose a novel game-theoretic approach to learning
transparent models on structured data. The game articulates
how the predictor model’s fitting can be traded off against
agreeing locally with a transparent witness. This work opens
up many avenues for future work, from theoretical analysis
of the games to a multi-player setting.
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A. Proofs
Our main results in this section make the following assump-
tions.
(A1) the predictor f is unconstrained.
(A2) both the loss and deviation are squared errors.
(A3) |B(xi)| = m,∀xi ∈ Dx.
(A4) xj ∈ B(xi) =⇒ xi ∈ B(xj),∀xi, xj ∈ Dx.
(A5) ∪xi∈DxB(xi) = Dx.
We note that (A3) and (A4) are not technically necessary
but simplify the presentation. We denote the predictor in the
uniform criterion (Eq. (2)), the symmetric game (Eq. (3)),
and the asymmetric (Eq. (4)) game as fU , fS , and fA, re-
spectively. We use Xi ∈ Rm×d to denote the neighbor-
hood B(xi) = {x′1, . . . , x′m} (Xi = [x′1, . . . , x′m]>), and
f(Xi) ∈ Rm to denote the vector [f(x′1), . . . , f(x′m)]>.
X†j denotes the pseudo-inverse of Xj . Then we have
Theorem 2. If (A1-5) hold and the witness is in the linear
family, the optimal fS satisfies
f∗S(xi) =
1
1 + λ
[
yi +
λ
m
( ∑
xj∈B(xi)
X†j f
∗
S(Xj)
)>
xi
]
,
and the optimal fA, at every equilibrium, is the fixed point
f∗A(xi) =
1
1 + λ
[
yi + λ(X
†
i f
∗
A(Xi))
>xi
]
,∀xi ∈ Dx.
Proof. We first re-write the symmetric criterion explicitly
as a game:
min
f
∑
i
(f(xi)− yi)2 + λ
m
∑
xj∈B(xi)
(f(xj)− gˆxi(xj))2,
where gˆxi is the best response strategy from the local wit-
ness.
Since f is unconstrained and the objective in convex in it,
we can treat each f(xi) as a distinct variable, and use the
derivative to find its optimum:
f∗S(xi) =
1
1 + λ
[
yi +
λ
m
∑
xj∈B−1(xi)
gˆxj (xi)
]
=
1
1 + λ
[
yi +
λ
m
∑
xj∈B(xi)
gˆxj (xi)
]
, (7)
where B−1(xi) = {xj ∈ Dx : xi ∈ B(xj)}. Note that we
only have to collect witnesses gˆxj that are relevant to f(xi)
for the first equality, and the second equality is due to (A4).
On the other hand, the objective for f in the asymmetric
game is:
min
f
∑
i
(f(xi)− yi)2 + λ(f(xi)− gˆxi(xi))2,
The corresponding optimum is:
f∗A(xi) =
1
1 + λ
[
yi + λgˆxi(xi)
]
(8)
For both games, the objective for gxi can be described as:
min
gxi
λ
m
∑
xj∈B(xi)
(f(xj)− gxi(xj))2
= min
θi
λ
m
‖f(Xi)−Xiθi‖22, (9)
Then Eq. (10) is an optimal witness g∗xi at xi.
g∗xi(xj) = θ
>
i xj = (X
†
i f(Xi))
>xj ,∀xj ∈ X , (10)
and we note that every optimal witness g∗xi has the same
values on B(xi)
Since the optimal g∗xi is functionally dependent to f . we put
Eq. (10) back to Eq. (7) to obtain the optimal condition for
f∗S (at equilibrium) as
f∗S(xi) =
1
1 + λ
[
yi +
λ
m
(
∑
xj∈B(xi)
X†j f
∗
S(Xj))
>xi
]
.
Again, putting Eq. (10) back to Eq. (8), we obtain the
optimal condition for f∗A at equilibrium as
f∗A(xi) =
1
1 + λ
[
yi + λ(X
†
i f
∗
A(Xi))
>xi
]
.
Note that the equilibrium for the linear class is not unique
when the solution of Eq. (9) is not unique: there may be
infinitely many optimal solution to the witness in a neigh-
borhood due to degeneracy. In this case, Theorem 2 adopts
the minimum norm solution as used in the pseudo-inverse in
Eq. (10). In this case, one may use Ridge regression instead
to establish a strongly convex objective for the witness to
ensure a unique solution, where the objective for the witness
is rewritten as
min
θi
λ
m
‖f(Xi)−Xiθi‖22 + α‖θi‖22, (11)
with a positive α.
Theorem 3. If (A1-5) hold and the witness is in the linear
family, the optimal fU satisfies
f∗U (xi) =

α(xi, f
∗
U ), if α(xi, f
∗
U ) > yi,
β(xi, f
∗
U ), if β(xi, f
∗
U ) < yi,
yi, otherwise,
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for xi ∈ Dx, where
α(xi, f
∗
U ) = max
xj∈B(xi)
[
(X†j f
∗
U (Xj))
>xi
−
√
δm−
∑
xk∈B(xj)\{xi}
(f∗U (xk)− (X†j f∗U (Xj))>xk)2
]
;
β(xi, f
∗
U ) = min
xj∈B(xi)
[
(X†j f
∗
U (Xj))
>xi
+
√
δm−
∑
xk∈B(xj)\{xi}
(f∗U (xk)− (X†j f∗U (Xj))>xk)2
]
.
Proof. The objective for the uniform criterion is:
min
f
N∑
i=1
(f(xi)− yi)2 (12)
s.t. min
g∈G
1
m
∑
xj∈B(xi)
(f(xj)− g(xj))2 ≤ δ, ∀xi ∈ Dx.
Our strategy is to temporarily treat each g as a fixed function,
and then replace it with its best response strategy.
Since f is unconstrained (in capacity), we can treat each
f(xi) as a distinct variable for optimization. For each f(xi),
we first filter its relevant criteria:
min
f(xi)
(f(xi)− yi)2
s.t. (f(xi)− gxj (xi))2,≤ δm
−
∑
xk∈B(xj)\{xi}
(f(xk)− gxj (xk))2,∀xj ∈ B(xi).
For any feasible f , we can further rewrite the constraint of
f(xi) with respect to each xj as:
gxj (xi)−
√
δm−
∑
xk∈B(xj)\{xi}
(f(xk)− gxj (xk))2
≤ f(xi)
≤ gxj (xi) +
√
δm−
∑
xk∈B(xj)\{xi}
(f(xk)− gxj (xk))2.
Collectively, we can fold all the upper bounds of f(xi) as
f(xi) ≤ min
xj∈B(xi)
[
gxj (xi)
+
√
δm−
∑
xk∈B(xj)\{xi}
(f(xk)− gxj (xk))2
]
.
All the lower bounds can be folded similarly.
Finally, since the objective for f(xi) is simply a squared
error with an interval constraint, evidently if yi satisfies the
lower bounds and upper bounds, then f∗U (xi) = yi. If
yi > min
xj∈B(xi)
[
gxj (xi)
+
√
δm−
∑
xk∈B(xj)\{xi}
(f(xk)− gxj (xk))2
]
,
then we have
f∗U (xi) = min
xj∈B(xi)
[
gxj (xi)
+
√
δm−
∑
xk∈B(xj)\{xi}
(f(xk)− gxj (xk))2
]
.
Otherwise, we have
f∗U (xi) = max
xj∈B(xi)
[
gxj (xi)
−
√
δm−
∑
xk∈B(xj)\{xi}
(f(xk)− gxj (xk))2
]
.
For each gxi is in the linear class, Eq. (13) is an optimal
solution.
g∗xj (xi) = (X
†
j f(Xj))
>xi,∀xi ∈ X , (13)
and we note that every optimal witness g∗xj has the same
values on B(xj).
Since the optimal g∗xi is functionally dependent to f , to
obtain the optimal f∗U , we combine our previous result with
g∗xi such that the optimality conditions for f and gxi are
both satisfied. Finally, we have
f∗U (xi) =

α(xi, f
∗
U ), if α(xi, f
∗
U ) > yi,
β(xi, f
∗
U ), if β(xi, f
∗
U ) < yi,
yi, otherwise,
for xi ∈ Dx, where
α(xi, f
∗
U ) = max
xj∈B(xi)
[
(X†j f
∗
U (Xj))
>xi
−
√
δm−
∑
xk∈B(xj)\{xi}
(f∗U (xk)− (X†j f∗U (Xj))>xk)2
]
;
β(xi, f
∗
U ) = min
xj∈B(xi)
[
(X†j f
∗
U (Xj))
>xi
+
√
δm−
∑
xk∈B(xj)\{xi}
(f∗U (xk)− (X†j f∗U (Xj))>xk)2
]
.
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Lemma 4. If d(·, ·) is squared error, L(·, ·) is differentiable,
f is sub-differentiable, and A(4-5) hold, then∑
(xi,yi)∈D
L(f(xi), yi) + λ
N¯i
[
N¯if(xi)−
∑
xt∈B(xi)
gˆxt(xi)
|B(xt)|
]2
,
(14)
where N¯i :=
∑
xt∈B(xi)
1
|B(xt)| , induces the same equilib-
rium as the symmetric game.
Proof. Since the criteria for the witness gxi are the same in
the symmetric game and the proposed asymmetric criterion
here, we only have to check for the optimality condition for
the predictor f . If we use∇θf(x) to denote the subgradient
of f at x with respect to the underlying parameter θ, the
optimality condition for Eq. (14) is
0 ∈
∑
(xi,yi)∈D
[
∂
∂f(xi)
L(f(xi), yi)
+ 2λ(
∑
xt∈B(xi)
f(xi)
|B(xt)| −
∑
xt∈B(xi)
gˆxt(xi)
|B(xt)| )
]
∇θf(xi)
=
∑
(xi,yi)∈D
[
∂
∂f(xi)
L(f(xi), yi)∇θf(xi)
+
∑
xt∈B(xi)
2λ
|B(xt)| (f(xi)− gˆxt(xi))∇θf(xi)
]
For the symmetric game, the optimality condition is
0 ∈
∑
(xi,yi)∈D
[
∂
∂f(xi)
L(f(xi), yi)∇θf(xi)
+
∑
xt∈B(xi)
2λ
|B(xi)| (f(xt)− gˆxi(xt))∇θf(xt)
]
It is evident that the two conditions coincide if Eq. (15) is
equal to Eq. (16).∑
(xi,yi)∈D
∑
xt∈B(xi)
1
|B(xi)| (f(xt)− gˆxi(xt))∇θf(xt)
(15)
=
∑
xt∈∪xi∈DxB(xi)
∑
xi∈B−1(xt)
1
|B(xi)| (f(xt)− gˆxi(xt))∇θf(xt)
=
∑
xt∈Dx
∑
xi∈B(xt)
1
|B(xi)| (f(xt)− gˆxi(xt))∇θf(xt)
=
∑
(xi,yi)∈D
∑
xt∈B(xi)
1
|B(xt)| (f(xi)− gˆxt(xi))∇θf(xi),
(16)
where the first equality is simply re-ordering of the two sum-
mations, and the second equality is due to xt ∈ B(xi) ⇐⇒
xi ∈ B(xt) and ∪xi∈DxB(xi) = Dx.
Figure 5. The cumulative distribution function of the total variation
loss between the predictor f and the local witness g in each training
neighborhood.
B. Supplementary Materials for Molecule
Property Prediction
Implementation. To conduct training, we use GCNs as the
predictor with 6 layers of graph convolution with 1800 hid-
den dimension. We use a 80%/10%/10% split for training
/ validation / testing.
Visualization. To investigate the behavior of the models,
we plot their total variation loss from the local witness
among the training neighborhoods in Figure 5. The uni-
form criterion imposes a strict functional constraint, while
the symmetric game allows a more flexible model, exhibit-
ing a tiny fraction of high deviation among the training
neighborhoods.
C. Supplementary Materials for Physical
Component Modeling
Implementation. We randomly sample 85%, 5%, and
10% of the data for training, validation, and testing.
All the hidden dimensions are set to 128. We use
the MultivariateNormalTriL function in Tensor-
flow (Abadi et al., 2016) to parametrize the multivariate
Gaussian distribution. Specifically, we let the network out-
put a N + (N+1)(N)2 dimensional vector. The first N dimen-
sions are treated as the mean. The second part is transformed
to a lower triangular matrix, where the diagonal is further
processed with a softplus nonlinearity. Such representation
satisfies the Cholesky decomposition for covariance matrix.
For fitting the linear witness, we use Ridge regression in
scikit-learn (Pedregosa et al., 2011) with the default
hyperparameter. The usage of Ridge regression instead of
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Figure 6. Visualization of the witnesses with the their parameters (middle and right plots) for teacher-forced predictions on the first
channel (left plot) along each timestamp (x-axis) on the bearing dataset. The y-axis of the parameters from 0 to 8 denotes the bias (θ0)1
and weights (θ1)1,1:4, (θ2)1,1:4.
Figure 7. Parameter analysis of  on the GAME model with λ = 1.
vanilla linear regression is justified by our analysis of the
equilibrium for linear witnesses.
Visualization. The visualization for the teacher-forced gen-
erative trajectory is in Figure 6.
Neighborhood size analysis
Here we investigate the effect of neighborhood radius .
The results are shown in Figure 7. The impact of the neigh-
borhood size is quite monotonic to deviation and TV, but
in a reverse way. As  increases, the weight of the wit-
ness on fitting the current point xi among the neighborhood
B(xi) decreases, so the deviation of the witness gˆxi(xi)
from f(xi) increases. In contrast, as more points are over-
lapped between the neighborhoods of consecutive points, the
resulting witnesses are more similar and thus yield smaller
TV. In terms of prediction error, as the neighborhood radius
 determines the region to impose coherency, a larger re-
gion leads to greater restriction on the predictive model. All
the arguments are well supported by the empirical results.
We suggest users to trade off faithfulness (deviation) and
smooth transition of functional properties (TV) based on the
application at hand. We note that, however, smooth transi-
tion of functional properties is not equivalent to smoothness
of f .
Finally, we remark that our sample complexity analysis
for the linear class suggests that the neighborhood size is
guaranteed to be effective when 2+ 1 > d = 2c+ 1 = 9.
However, since the result is an sufficient condition, the
regularization may still happens when  < 5 (e.g., if the
matrix rank of a neighborhood Xi = [xi−, . . . , xi+]> is
less than min{d,m} = min{2c+ 1, 2+ 1}).
